Checkpointing algorithms are classi ed as synchronous and asynchronous in the literature. In synchronous checkpointing, processes synchronize their checkpointing activities so that a globally consistent set of checkpoints is always maintained in the system. Synchronizing checkpointing activity involves message overhead and process execution may have to be suspended during the checkpointing coordination, resulting in performance degradation. In asynchronous checkpointing, processes take checkpoints without any coordination with others. Asynchronous checkpointing provides maximum autonomy for processes to take checkpoints; however, some of the checkpoints taken may not lie on any consistent global checkpoint, thus making the checkpointing efforts useless. Asynchronous checkpointing algorithms in the literature can reduce the number of useless checkpoints by making processes take communication induced checkpoints, besides asynchronous checkpoints. We call such algorithms, quasi-synchronous. Quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms are attractive because they improve the performance without introducing undesirable e ects. In this paper, we present a theoretical framework for characterizing and classifying such algorithms. The theory not only helps to classify and characterize the quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms, but also helps analyzing the properties and limitations of the algorithms belonging to each class; it also provides guidelines for designing and evaluating such algorithms. This classi cation also sheds light on some open problems that remain to be solved.
Introduction
During the execution of a distributed computation, processes exchange information via messages. The message exchange establishes causal dependencies among states of processes 1 . The causal dependency among the states of processes is formally characterized by Lamport's \happened before" relation 8]. Informally, a state s q of a process P q is causally dependent on a state s p of another process P p if a message (or sequences of messages) sent by P p after state s p was received by P q before reaching state s q .
A local checkpoint of a process is a recorded state of the process. A set of local checkpoints, one from each of the processes involved in a distributed computation, is called a consistent global checkpoint if none of them is causally dependent on any other checkpoint in the set. Determining consistent global checkpoints has applications in several areas of distributed system design 6]. Some areas of application are failure recovery, debugging distributed software, monitoring distributed events such as in industrial process control, setting distributed breakpoints, and protocol speci cation and veri cation.
In the literature, several checkpointing schemes have been proposed for distributed systems. These schemes are generally classi ed into two categories { synchronous and asynchronous. In synchronous checkpointing schemes, processes synchronize their checkpointing activities so that a globally consistent set of checkpoints is always maintained in the system 3, 5, 9] . The storage requirement for the checkpoints is minimum because each process keeps only one checkpoint in the stable storage at any given time. Major disadvantages of synchronous checkpointing are, (i) process execution may have to be suspended during the checkpointing coordination as in 5], resulting in performance degradation and (ii) it requires extra message overhead to synchronize the checkpointing activity.
In asynchronous checkpointing 1, 7] , processes take local checkpoints periodically without any coordination with each other. This approach allows maximum process autonomy for taking checkpoints and has no message overhead for local checkpointing. A process de-termines consistent global checkpoints by communicating with other processes to determine the dependency among local checkpoints.
In asynchronous checkpointing, it could very well happen that processes took checkpoints such that none of the checkpoints lies on a consistent global checkpoint. A local checkpoint that cannot be part of a consistent global checkpoint is said to be useless. A local checkpoint that can be part of a consistent global checkpoint is called an useful checkpoint. Figure 1 illustrates a distributed computation in which two processes take checkpoints asynchronously. Note that none of the checkpoints taken is useful and all checkpointing e ort is wasted. Figure 1 shows the worst case scenario; however, in general, a number of checkpoints will be useful. The number of useless checkpoints taken by processes can be reduced by requiring processes to take communication induced checkpoints, in addition to checkpoints taken independently 11, 18, 20] . The checkpointing algorithms that require processes to take communication induced checkpoints are called quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms, because some checkpointing activity is triggered by the message pattern and knowledge gained about the dependency between checkpoints of processes. Checkpoints taken by processes independently are called basic checkpoints and the communication induced checkpoints are called forced checkpoints. The primary goal of a quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithm is to minimize the number of useless checkpoints and maximize the number of useful checkpoints in a computation. For example, in Figure 1 , if each process took a forced checkpoint prior to receiving every message, then all the checkpoints taken would be useful.
Paper Objectives
Quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms are attractive because they improve the performance without introducing any undesirable e ects. We provide a theoretical framework for the characterization and classi cation of quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms. The characterization and the classi cation provide a deeper understanding of the principles underlying quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms, help us evaluate such algorithms and provide guidelines for designing more e cient checkpointing algorithms. The classi cation also provides a clear understanding of the properties of the checkpointing algorithms belonging to each class.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background required for the paper. In Section 3, we provide a characterization of quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms. In Section 4, we present a classi cation of quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms. The merits of the classi cation are discussed in Section 5. We also discuss existing open problems in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

System Model
The distributed computation we consider consists of N spatially separated sequential processes denoted by P 1 , P 2 , , P N . The processes do not share a common memory or a common clock. Message passing is the only way for processes to communicate with one another. The computation is asynchronous: each process progresses at its own speed and messages are exchanged through reliable communication channels, whose transmission delays are nite but arbitrary. Communication channels are FIFO.
Execution of a process is modeled by three types of events { the send event of a message, the receive event of a message and an internal event. The states of processes depend on one another due to interprocess communication. Lamport Each checkpoint taken by a process is assigned a unique sequence number. The i th (i 0) checkpoint of process P p is assigned the sequence number i and is denoted by C p;i . We assume that each process takes an initial checkpoint before execution begins and a virtual checkpoint after execution ends. Sometimes, checkpoints are also denoted by the letters A; B; or C for clarity. The i th checkpoint interval of process P p is all the computation performed between its (i ? 1) th and i th checkpoints (and includes the (i ? 1) th checkpoint but not i th ).
The send and the receive events of a message M are denoted respectively by send(M) and receive(M). So 
Z-paths and their Properties
Netzer and Xu 13] gave a necessary and su cient condition for a given set of checkpoints to be part of a consistent global checkpoint. They introduced the notion of zigzag path, which is a generalization of a causal path 3 induced by the Lamport's happened before relation. A zigzag path (or a Z-path for short) between two checkpoints is like a causal path, but a 2 Also called a consistent global snapshot or a consistent cut. 3 A causal path from a checkpoint A to checkpoint B exists if and only if there exists a sequence of messages m 1 ; m 2 ; ; m n such that m 1 is sent after A, m n is received before B, and m i is received by some process before the same process sends m i+1 (1 i < n).
Z-path allows a message to be sent before the previous one in the path is received. Formally, a Z-path between two checkpoints is de ned 10, 13] as:
De nition 2 A Z-path exists from C p;i to C q;j if 1. p = q and i < j (i.e., the two checkpoints are from the same process and the former precedes the later) or 2. there exist messages m 1 ; m 2 ; ; m n (n 1) such that (a) m 1 is sent by process P p after C p;i , (b) if m k (1 k < n) is received by P r , then m k+1 is sent by P r in the same or later checkpoint interval (although m k+1 may be sent before or after m k is received), and (c) m n is received by P q before C q;j .
Note that the existence of Z-paths is a transitive relation. In other words, if there exists a Z-path from A to B and a Z-path from B to C, then there exists a Z-path from A to C. A checkpoint C is said to be in a Z-cycle if there exists a Z-path from C to itself. Figure 2 illustrates the Z-paths and Z-cycles in a distributed computation. In Figure 2 , there is a Z-path from checkpoint A to checkpoint B because message m 1 was sent after A, m 2 was sent in the same checkpoint interval in which m 1 was received, and m 2 was received before B. Also, there is a Z-cycle from the checkpoint C to itself, since message m 4 was sent after C, m 3 was sent in the same checkpoint interval in which m 4 was received, and m 3 was received before C. The dashed lines are some of the cuts that can be drawn through A and B, or through C. Any cut passing through A and B is an inconsistent cut since in any such cut, either (i) the send event of m 1 will not be recorded while its receive event would be recorded or (ii) the send event of m 2 will not be recorded while its receive event would be recorded. Similarly, any cut passing through C is an inconsistent cut since in any such cut, either (i) the send event of m 3 will not be recorded while its receive event would be recorded or (ii) the send event of m 4 will not be recorded while its receive event would be recorded.
It is important to note the di erence between the causal paths induced by Lamport's happened before relation and the Z-paths. Any causal path is also a Z-path. However, a Z-path need not be a causal path. For example, in Figure 2 , the message sequence m 1 ; m 2 constitutes a Z-path from A to B but not a causal path from A to B. Thus, Z-path is a generalization of causal path. It is possible that there exists a Z-cycle from a checkpoint to itself (for example, there exists a Z-cycle from C to itself, this cycle being caused by the message sequence m 4 ; m 3 ); however, there can be no causal cycle from a checkpoint to itself since happened before relation is a partial order relation.
To formally reason about Z-paths and causal paths, the following notations are used. Proof: Follows from Theorem 1 by taking S = fCg. 2 We rst review some of the results in 10] to make the paper self contained. Given a set S of checkpoints such that S 6 zp ; S, those checkpoints that have no Z-paths from or to any of the checkpoints in S are possible candidates for extending S to a consistent global checkpoint. The set of all such checkpoints is called the Z-cone of S. The set of all those checkpoints that have no causal path from or to any of the checkpoints in S is called the C-cone of S. Clearly, the Z-cone of S is a subset of the C-cone of S. The Z-cone and the C-cone of a set of checkpoints S are depicted pictorially in Figure 3 . Formally, the Z-cone and the C-cone of a given set S can be de ned as follows:
De nition 4 Let S be a set of checkpoints such that S 6 zp ; S. Then, the Z-cone of S, Given a set of checkpoints S such that S 6 zp ; S, for each process not represented in S, if we include in S the rst checkpoint in the Z-cone of S, then the resulting set is guaranteed to be the minimal consistent global checkpoint containing S. Likewise, for each process not represented in S, if we include in S the last checkpoint in the Z-cone of S, then the resulting set is guaranteed to be the maximal consistent global checkpoint containing S. The dotted lines in Figure 4 pass through the maximal and the minimal consistent global checkpoints containing the set S. Formally, these results are stated in Theorems 2 and 3, the proofs of which can be found in 10]. Theorem 2 Let S be a set of checkpoints such that S 6 zp ; S and let S max = fC q;j j (C q;j 2 Z-cone(S))^(8 k > j; C q;k 6 2 Z-cone(S))g:
Then S max is the maximal consistent global checkpoint containing S.
Theorem 3 Let S be a set of checkpoints such that S 6 zp ; S and let S min = fC q;j j (C q;j 2 Z-cone(S))^(8 k < j; C q;k 6 2 Z-cone(S))g:
Then S min is the minimal consistent global checkpoint containing S.
A Characterization of Quasi-Synchronous Checkpointing
As we have seen earlier (Figure 1 ), when processes take checkpoints asynchronously, some or all of the checkpoints taken may be useless. In quasi-synchronous checkpointing, processes take communication-induced checkpoints to reduce the number of useless checkpoints; the message pattern and knowledge gained about the dependency between checkpoints of processes trigger communication-induced checkpoints so that the number of useless checkpoints is minimized or eliminated. Let us rst understand how checkpoints become useless and how we can convert useless checkpoints into useful checkpoints. for at least one i (1 i < n), m i is received by some process P r after sending the message m i+1 in the same checkpoint interval.
Thus, non-causal Z-paths are those Z-paths that are not causal paths; in particular, Zcycles are non-causal Z-paths. By Theorem 1, if there exists a non-causal Z-path between two (not necessarily distinct) checkpoints, then the two checkpoints together are useless for constructing a consistent global checkpoint. Moreover, non-causal Z-paths between checkpoints are hard to track on-line, and hence the presence of non-causal Z-paths complicates the task of nding consistent global checkpoints. However, non-causal Z-paths between checkpoints are preventable if processes take additional checkpoints at appropriate times. For example, in Figure 5 , the message sequence m 1 ; m 2 constitutes a non-causal Z-path from C 1;1 to C 3;1 since m 2 is sent before receiving the message m 1 in the same checkpoint interval; if P 2 took a checkpoint A before receiving the message m 1 but after sending the message m 2 , then this non-causal Z-path could have been prevented and as a result the checkpoints C 1;1 and C 3;1 could have been used to construct the consistent global checkpoint fC 1;1 ; A; C 3;1 g. Similarly, the message sequence m 3 ; m 1 is a non-causal Z-path from C 2;2 to itself (in fact a Z-cycle); this Z-cycle could have been prevented if process P 1 took a checkpoint B after sending the message m 1 but before receiving message m 3 which would have made C 2;2 useful for constructing a consistent global checkpoint (in fact, fB; C 2;2 ; C 3;1 g would have been one such consistent global checkpoint).
Thus, even though non-causal Z-paths between checkpoints are harmful, they are preventable if processes take additional checkpoints at appropriate places. Preventing all the non-causal Z-paths between checkpoints by making processes take additional checkpoints at appropriate places not only makes all the checkpoints useful but also facilitates construction of consistent global checkpoints incrementally and easily; this is because, in the absence of non-causal Z-paths, any set of checkpoints that are not pairwise causally related can be extended to a consistent global checkpoint by Theorem 1 and causality between checkpoints can be tracked on-line by using vector timestamps 12, 14] or similar mechanisms.
Thus, the primary issues involved in designing a quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithm are (i) how to e ciently determine appropriate events for processes to take communication induced checkpoints so that non-causal Z-paths can be eliminated and (ii) how to minimize the number of communication induced checkpoints taken. Depending upon the strategy adopted to address these issues, non-causal Z-paths between checkpoints can be prevented to varying degrees. Depending on the degree to which the non-causal Z-paths are prevented, quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms exhibit di erent properties and can be classi ed into various classes. This classi cation helps to understand the properties and limitations of various checkpointing algorithms which is helpful for comparing their performance; it also helps in designing more e cient algorithms. Next, we present a classi cation of quasi-synchronous checkpointing.
Classi cation of Quasi-Synchronous Checkpointing
We classify quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms into four di erent classes, namely, Strictly Z-Path Free (SZPF), Z-Path Free (ZPF), Z-Cycle Free (ZCF), and Partially Z-Cycle Free (PZCF). This classi cation is based on the degree to which the formation of non-causal Z-paths are prevented. We present the properties of the algorithms belonging to each class and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of algorithms belonging to one class over the other. We also present the relationship of the classi cation to existing work in the literature.
Strictly Z-path Free Checkpointing
Strictly Z-path free checkpointing eliminates all the non-causal Z-paths between checkpoints altogether and is the strongest of all the classes. pattern and then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a system that is strictly Z-path free.
De nition 6 A checkpointing pattern is said to be strictly Z-path free (or SZPF) if there exists no non-causal Z-path between any two (not necessarily distinct) checkpoints.
In a SZPF system, since there is no non-causal Z-path, every Z-path is a causal path. The following theorem gives the necessary and su cient conditions for a system to be SZPF. This theorem is helpful in verifying if a given checkpointing algorithm makes the system SZPF.
Theorem 4 A checkpointing pattern is SZPF if and only if in every checkpoint interval, all the message-receive events precede all the message-send events.
Proof: ()) Suppose there exists a checkpoint interval in which a message-send event precedes a message-receive event. In other words, there exists a process P p and messages m 1 and m 2 such that P p sends m 2 and then receives m 1 in the same checkpoint interval. Suppose m 1 is sent by P q after taking checkpoint A and m 2 is received by P r before taking checkpoint B. Then, the message sequence m 1 ; m 2 forms a non-causal Z-path from A to B since m 2 is sent in the same checkpoint interval before receiving m 1 . This implies that the system is not SZPF. Hence, in every checkpoint interval of a SZPF system, all the message-receive events precede all the message-send events. (() Conversely, if all message-receive events precede all the message-send events in each checkpoint interval, then clearly there is no non-causal Z-path between checkpoints and hence the system is SZPF. 2
From Theorem 4, it is clear that the checkpointing pattern shown in Figure 6 is SZPF. In this gure, the forced checkpoint C 2;1 is taken, to prevent the non-causal Z-path m 2 ; m 5 from C 1;0 to C 3;1 . Similarly, the forced checkpoint C 2;3 is taken to prevent the non-causal Z-path m 3 ; m 6 from C 1;1 to C 3;2 ; the forced checkpoint C 1;2 is taken to prevent the non-causal Z-path m 4 ; m 3 (in fact a Z-cycle) from C 2;4 to itself. We next discuss the properties of a SZPF system.
Properties of a SZPF System
A SZPF system has many interesting and desirable properties. We rst show that in a SZPF system, each checkpoint taken is useful and constructing consistent global checkpoints is easy. Proof: A Z-cycle is a non-causal Z-path from a checkpoint to itself. However, in a SZPF system, there is no non-causal Z-path between any two (not necessarily distinct) checkpoints and hence none of the checkpoints lies on a Z-cycle. Hence, by Corollary 1, all the checkpoints are useful for constructing consistent global checkpoints. 2
In a SZPF system, any pair of checkpoints between which there is no causal path is useful for constructing a consistent global checkpoint. In fact, a more general result is stated in the following theorem. The following theorem not only presents a necessary and su cient condition for a given set of local checkpoints to be part of a consistent global checkpoint but also provides a method for constructing them incrementally. ; relation) can be tracked on-line using vector timestamps or similar other mechanisms 12, 14], constructing consistent global checkpoints incrementally using this method is simple and practical. In a non-SZPF system however, it is not easy to construct consistent global checkpoints incrementally due to the presence of non-causal Z-paths because tracking non-causal Z-paths on-line is di cult.
The following lemma states that the Z-cone(S) and the C-cone(S) are identical in a SZPF system. Lemma 2 In a SZPF system, for any set of checkpoints S, the C-cone(S) is same as the Z-cone(S).
Proof: In a SZPF system, every Z-path is a causal path and hence the lemma follows. 2
The fact that the Z-cone(S) and the C-cone(S) are identical in a SZPF system facilitates the construction of the maximal and the minimal consistent global checkpoints containing a given set S. If S 6 cp ; S, then by adding to S the latest checkpoint from each process that is not causally related to any of the checkpoints in S (i.e., the checkpoints lying on the trailing edge of the C-cone(S)), we can obtain the maximal consistent global checkpoint containing S. The minimal consistent global checkpoint containing S can be constructed by adding to S the earliest checkpoint from each process that is not causally related to any of the checkpoints in S (i.e., the checkpoints lying on the leading edge of the C-cone(S)).
Relation to Existing Work
The No-Receive-After-Send method: The No-Receive-After-Send (NRAS) checkpointing method 19] disallows any message to be received in any checkpoint interval once a message has been sent in that checkpoint interval. Thus, all message send events precede all message receive events in each checkpoint interval. Hence, it follows from Theorem 4 that the NRAS checkpointing method makes the system SZPF. A distributed computation taking checkpoints using the NRAS checkpointing method is shown in Figure 7 . The Checkpoint-After-Send method: In Checkpoint-After-Send (CAS) method 19], a checkpoint must be taken after every send event. Thus, any checkpoint interval can have at most one message-send event and it must appear at the end of the interval. Hence, CAS method of checkpointing makes the system SZPF by Theorem 4. Since NRAS method allows several message-send events to take place in the same checkpoint interval, the CAS method will have higher checkpointing overhead than the NRAS method. However, the CAS checkpointing method has the following very interesting and useful property: \the set consisting of all the latest checkpoints of all the processes forms a consistent global checkpoint". However, this property comes at the expense of high checkpointing overhead. For the distributed computation in Figure 7 , the checkpoints taken using CAS method are shown in Figure 8 . The Checkpoint-Before-Receive method: In Checkpoint-Before-Receive (CBR) method 19], a checkpoint must be taken before every receive event. Thus, any checkpoint interval can have at most one message-receive event and it always appears at the beginning of the interval. Hence it makes the system SZPF by Theorem 4. The checkpoints taken for the distributed computation of Figure 7 using the CBR method is shown in Figure 9 . Note that the CAS method and the CBR method will have the same checkpointing overhead since the number of checkpoints taken in both cases is equal to the number of messages. However, in the CBR method, the latest checkpoints of processes do not form a consistent global checkpoint. The Checkpoint-After-Send-Before-Receive method: In the Checkpoint-After-SendBefore-Receive (CASBR) method 19], a checkpoint must be taken after every messagesend event and before every message-receive event. In the CASBR method, any checkpoint interval can have at most one message-receive event and/or one message-send event and the receive event should precede the send event if an interval contains both a receive event and a send event; thus, it makes the system SZPF by Theorem 4. In the CASBR method, processes take twice as many forced checkpoints as in either CAS method or CBR method; this is because, in CAS method or CBR method, corresponding to each message one forced checkpoint is taken whereas under the CASBR method, corresponding each message two forced checkpoints (one by the sender and one by the receiver of the message) are taken. For the distributed computation of Figure 7 , the checkpoints taken using the CASBR method is shown in Figure 10 
Z-path Free Checkpointing
In a SZPF system, absence of non-causal Z-paths between checkpoints makes all the checkpoints useful and also facilitates the construction of consistent global checkpoints incrementally. We can have these desirable features of a SZPF system without actually eliminating Thus, in a ZPF system, even though non-causal Z-paths may exist between checkpoints, they always have a sibling causal path and thus all such non-causal Z-paths can be tracked on-line through the corresponding sibling causal paths. Figure 11 shows a distributed computation that is ZPF but not SZPF. In this gure, forced checkpoints are taken to prevent non-causal Z-paths corresponding to which there exists no sibling causal path. For example, forced checkpoint C 1;2 is taken by P 1 to prevent non-causal Z-path m 3 ; m 2 (in fact a Z-cycle from C 2;4 to itself); forced checkpoint C 2;1 is taken by process P 2 to prevent the Z-path m 1 ; m 4 (a Z-path from C 1;0 to C 3;1 ). However, even though there exists a non-causal Z-path m 2 ; m 5 from C 1;1 to C 3;2 , no forced checkpoint is taken by process P 2 to prevent this Z-path because there exists a sibling causal path m 2 ; m 6 .
Properties of a ZPF System
A ZPF system has all the interesting properties of a SZPF system. The following lemma shows that each checkpoint taken is useful in a ZPF system. The following theorem gives a necessary and su cient condition for a given set of local checkpoints to be part of a consistent global checkpoint and also provides a method for constructing them incrementally. The following lemma shows that SZPF =) ZPF.
Lemma 4 If a system is SZPF, then it is ZPF, but the converse is not true.
Proof: In a SZPF system, there is no non-causal Z-path between any two (not necessarily distinct) checkpoints which trivially implies that for any two checkpoints A and B, A zp ; B i A cp ; B. Hence, a SZPF system is a ZPF system. The converse is not true. For example, the checkpointing pattern in Figure 11 is ZPF but not SZPF, since m 2 ; m 5 is a non-causal Z-path. 2 It is also easy to see that for any given set of checkpoints S, the Z-cone(S) and the Ccone(S) are identical in a ZPF system and hence nding the maximal and minimal consistent global checkpoints containing a target set of checkpoints is simple. Thus, a ZPF system has all the important features of a SZPF system | constructing consistent global checkpoints incrementally is simple and every checkpoint taken is useful for constructing consistent global checkpoint. In addition, for a given computation, ZPF checkpointing is likely to have less checkpointing overhead than any SZPF checkpointing. This is because in ZPF checkpointing, processes have to take forced checkpoints only to prevent non-causal Z-paths corresponding to which there exists no causal path whereas in SZPF checkpointing, processes have to take forced checkpoints to prevent all the non-causal Z-paths.
De nition 8 A ZPF-checkpointing algorithm is \optimal" if it makes processes take forced checkpoints \only" to prevent non-causal Z-paths corresponding to which there is no causal path.
Observation: Designing an optimal ZPF checkpointing algorithm seems to be impossible. This is because designing an optimal ZPF algorithm requires processes to have knowledge about future events. For example, in Figure 11 , upon receiving the message m 2 , P 2 cannot decide whether or not to take a forced checkpoint to prevent the non-causal Z-path m 2 ; m 5 ; an optimal ZPF checkpointing algorithm should not force P 2 to take a checkpoint before processing the message m 2 , because corresponding to the non-causal Z-path m 2 ; m 5 there is going to be a causal path m 2 ; m 6 in the future.
Equivalence of RD-trackable and ZPF systems
We show that the Rollback Dependency Trackable System (RD-Trackable System) 19] is equivalent to the ZPF system. We de ne the RD-Trackable system using the terminology of Z-paths; this de nition is equivalent to the original de De nition 9 A checkpointing pattern is said to satisfy rollback-dependency trackability (or is RD-trackable) i for any two checkpoints C p;i and C q;j , C p;i The following theorem establishes the equivalence of the ZPF system and the RDtrackable system.
Theorem 7 A checkpointing pattern is ZPF if and only if it is RD-trackable.
Proof: From the de nition, it follows that in a RD-trackable system, for any two checkpoints C p;i and C q;j , C p;i zp ; C q;j if and only if P q received a message M before taking the checkpoint C q;j and M causally depended on a message sent by P p in its (i + 1) th checkpoint interval or later (i.e., after taking the checkpoint C p;i ); in other words, C p;i zp ; C q;j if and only if a message M that causally depended on a message sent by P p after its checkpoint C p;i was received by P q before the checkpoint C q;j . Thus, a system is RD-trackable if and only if for any two checkpoints C p;i and C q;j , C p;i Wang 19] showed that both the FDAS method and the FDI method are RD-trackable. Hence, from Theorem 7, both FDAS and FDI methods are ZPF. It is easy to see that Venkatesh et al.'s checkpointing method is the same as the FDI method described above and hence is ZPF. Note that FDAS, FDI, and Venkatesh et al.'s checkpointing methods are not SZPF by Theorem 4. Of all these three methods, the FDAS method will have the lowest checkpointing overhead, since it makes a process take a forced checkpoint only if the dependency vector is about to change after the rst send event in a checkpoint interval, whereas in the other two methods a forced checkpoint is taken whenever the dependency vector is about to change.
Z-cycle Free Checkpointing
All checkpoints taken in a ZPF system and a SZPF system are useful. If the objective of a quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithm is just to make all checkpoints useful, it is not necessary to make the system either ZPF or SZPF. To make all checkpoints useful, it is su cient to prevent only all Z-cycles, from Corollary 1. Thus, we propose a further weaker model below where only Z-cycles are prevented.
De nition 10 A checkpointing pattern is said to be Z-cycle free (or ZCF) i none of the checkpoints lies on a Z-cycle. Figure 12 shows a distributed computation that is ZCF but not ZPF. In this gure, the forced checkpoint C 1;2 is taken by P 1 to prevent the Z-cycle m 3 ; m 2 from C 2;4 to itself. The message sequence m 1 ; m 4 forms a non-causal Z-path from C 1;0 to C 3;1 ; also, the message sequence m 2 ; m 5 forms a non-causal Z-path from C 1;1 to C 3;2 ; however, P 2 does not take forced checkpoints to prevent these non-causal Z-paths. (That is, a message sent after taking a checkpoint with sequence number i is received by a process only after taking a checkpoint with sequence number i).
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a Z-cycle from checkpoint C p;i to itself. Then, there exists a message sequence M 1 ; M 2 ; ; M n (n > 1) such that 1. M 1 is sent by process P p after C p;i , 2. if M k (1 k < n) is received by P r , then M k+1 is sent by P r in the same or later checkpoint interval (although M k+1 may be sent before or after M k is received), and 3. M n is received by P p before C p;i (i.e., receive(M n ) hb ?! C p;i ).
Note that for each k (1 k < n), message M k+1 is sent in the same or later checkpoint interval in which M k is received. Since M 1 :sn i, it follows from the condition given in the theorem and condition 2 above that M k :sn i 8k (1 k n). In particular, M n :sn i. Theorem 8 is useful in verifying whether a given checkpointing algorithm makes the system ZCF. It is easy to see that the condition given in the theorem is only su cient but not necessary for a system to be ZCF.
Properties of a ZCF system
An important feature of a ZCF system is that every checkpoint taken is useful, since none of the checkpoints is on a Z-cycle. It is also easy to see that a ZPF system is a ZCF system but not conversely. A ZCF system allows the formation of non-causal Z-paths among checkpoints that are not Z-cycles; therefore, it has less checkpointing overhead than a ZPF system. If a Zpath between two checkpoints is not prevented, the two checkpoints together cannot be part of a consistent global checkpoint; however, individually the two checkpoints can still be part of a consistent global checkpoint if they are not on Z-cycles. For example, in Figure 12 , the checkpoints C 1;1 and C 3;2 cannot be part of a consistent global checkpoint together because of the Z-path m 2 ; m 5 ; however, the sets fC 1;1 ; C 2;1 ; C 3;1 g and fC 1;2 ; C 2;2 ; C 3;2 g are consistent global checkpoints containing C 1;1 and C 3;2 respectively.
Even though every checkpoint in a ZCF system is useful for constructing a consistent global checkpoint, constructing a consistent global checkpoint incrementally is di cult due to the presence of non-causal Z-paths, which are di cult to track on-line. There is a trade o between weaker checkpointing model and the easeness of constructing consistent global checkpoints.
De nition 11 A ZCF-checkpointing algorithm is \optimal" if it makes processes take minimum number of forced checkpoints to prevent all Z-cycles.
Observation: Designing an optimal ZCF checkpointing algorithm seems to be impossible. This is because Z-cycles are non-causal Z-paths and tracking non-causal Z-paths on-line requires processes to have knowledge about future events.
Next, we present some ZCF quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms and explain how they handle the problem of nding consistent global checkpoints.
Relation to Existing Work
Briatico et al.'s algorithm: The algorithm of Briatico et al. 2] forces the receiver of a message to take a checkpoint if the sender's checkpoint interval number tagged with the message is higher than the current checkpoint interval number of the receiver. From Theorem 8, this checkpointing method makes all checkpoints Z-cycle free because a message sent in a checkpoint interval is never received in a checkpoint interval with a lower interval number. Checkpoints with the same sequence number form a consistent global checkpoint, however, the global checkpoint containing a given checkpoint found using this method may be far away from the maximal consistent global checkpoint containing the given checkpoint, since a process may be taking checkpoints at a low pace and not receiving any messages from the processes that are taking checkpoints at a faster pace.
Manivannan and Singhal's Algorithm: In the checkpointing algorithm of Manivannan and Singhal 11], each message is piggybacked with the sequence number of the current checkpoint. If the sequence number accompanying the message is greater than the sequence number of the current checkpoint of the process receiving the message, then the receiving process takes a checkpoint and assigns the sequence number received in the message as the sequence number to the new checkpoint, and then processes the message. Since a message sent after a checkpoint with sequence number i is never received by any process before taking a checkpoint with sequence number i, the system is ZCF by Theorem 8. It is proved in 11] that given a checkpoint C p;i , the set S p i = fC q;j j j is the smallest positive integer ig is a consistent global checkpoint containing C p;i . The consistent global checkpoint found using this method may not be close to the maximal one if processes do not take checkpoints at the same pace. To overcome this problem, each process P p maintains a counter sn p which is incremented at periodic time intervals, the time period being the smallest of the checkpoint time intervals of all the processes. When P p takes a basic checkpoint, it assigns the current value of the counter sn p as the sequence number for the checkpoint taken. If the current value of the counter sn p is less than or equal to the sequence number of its latest checkpoint (such a situation could arise if a process had already taken a forced checkpoint), then it skips taking a basic checkpoint. This approach helps keeping the sequence numbers of the latest checkpoints close to each other and also minimizes forced checkpoints. Since the sequence numbers of the latest checkpoints of the processes are close to each other, the consistent global checkpoint containing the latest checkpoint C p;i of a process P p found will be close to the maximal consistent global checkpoint containing C p;i .
Both the ZCF checkpointing algorithms presented above do not actually track Z-cycles to prevent them. They prevent Z-cycles using a heuristics and as a result they may force processes to take forced checkpoints even when there is no chance for the formation of Zcycles.
Partially Z-cycle Free Checkpointing
In ZCF checkpointing, none of the checkpoints taken lies on a Z-cycle and hence all the checkpoints are useful. This property of ZCF checkpointing is useful in many applications. For example, in rollback recovery, when a process fails, the failed process needs only to rollback to its latest checkpoint and other processes will have consistent local checkpoints to which they can rollback. In systems where failures are not frequent or in systems which can a ord to roll back to a great distance in the event of a failure, it may not be necessary to make all the checkpoints useful. Thus, it might be su cient to make only some of the checkpoints useful. We call such checkpointing patterns as partially Z-cycle free. Formally, partially Z-cycle free checkpointing pattern is de ned as follows.
De nition 12 A checkpointing pattern is said to be partially Z-cycle free (PZCF) if not all checkpoints are Z-cycle free.
The primary advantage of such checkpointing is that it has less checkpointing overhead than ZCF checkpointing; however, the presence of Z-cycles implies that some of the checkpoints taken will be useless and it also complicates the process of nding consistent global checkpoints.
Relation to Existing Work
Now, we present two checkpointing algorithms from the literature which makes the system PZCF.
Wang et al.'s Lazy Checkpoint Coordination: Wang and Fuchs 18] proposed lazy checkpoint coordination in which each message is piggybacked with the sequence number of the current checkpoint interval. They de ne the laziness Z, a prede ned system parameter which is a positive integer. During the normal execution, each process P p maintains a variable V which is initialized to Z and incremented by Z each time the checkpoint C p;nZ is taken where n is some positive integer. When P p in its x th checkpoint interval is about to process a message M tagged with the sender's checkpoint interval number y > V , P p is forced to take checkpoint C p;lZ where l = by=Zc. For any positive integer n, the checkpoints with sequence number nZ are Z-cycle free because a message sent after the checkpoint with sequence number nZ is never received by a process before taking checkpoint with sequence number nZ. Checkpoints whose sequence number are not multiples of Z may be on Z-cycles. So, this checkpointing method makes the system PZCF but not ZCF. From this observation, it also follows that for any positive integer n, checkpoints with sequence number nZ form a consistent global checkpoint. This checkpointing method will have less checkpointing overhead than that of Briatico et al. 2] since processes are forced to take a checkpoint only if the sequence number received in the message exceeds by at least Z from the sequence number of its latest checkpoint which has a sequence number of the form nZ. However, the method for nding consistent global checkpoints will yield less number of consistent global checkpoints than the one proposed in 2] if Z > 1 and there will be useless checkpoints. Xu and Netzer's Adaptive Checkpointing Algorithm: To our knowledge, Xu and Netzer 20] attempted for the rst time to design a checkpointing algorithm which tracks the Z-cycles on line and prevents them. In their method, each process P p maintains a dependency vector DV p of size N. The entry DV p p] denotes the current checkpoint number of P p . For the purpose of detecting Z-cycles, when a new checkpoint is taken, the current value of the vector DV p is copied to another variable ZV p . When P p sends a message M to P q , the current value of the vector DV p as well as the current value of ZV p q] is is piggybacked on M. Note that ZV p q]; q 6 = p is the sequence number of the latest checkpoint of P q that has a causal path to the current checkpoint of P p ; the integer value ZV p q] piggybacked with M is denoted by M:Zid. When the receiver P q receives M, P q takes a checkpoint before processing the message if M:Zid is same as its current checkpoint number; after processing the message, P q updates its vector DV q as follows: DV 
Discussion
Existing quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms in the literature have been designed without realizing the fact that the non-causal Z-paths between checkpoints are the primary cause for making checkpoints useless; we have shown that even though the designers of these algorithms did not explicitly state that they are trying prevent the formation of non-causal Z-paths between checkpoints that is exactly what they are trying to do. We presented four models of quasi-synchronous checkpointing{ namely, PZCF, ZCF, ZPF, SZPF and showed that SZPF =) ZPF =) ZCF=) PZCF. Figure 13 illustrates the relationship among these checkpointing models. These models help in classifying and comparing the existing quasisynchronous checkpointing algorithms.
In a SZPF system, all the checkpoints are useful for the purpose of constructing consistent global checkpoint. Constructing consistent global checkpoints incrementally is easy since we can easily check for causality while constructing consistent global checkpoints.
In terms of nding consistent global checkpoints and making checkpoints useful for the purpose of constructing consistent global checkpoint, ZPF system has the same advantages as a SZPF system. However, an optimal algorithm that makes the system ZPF is better than any algorithm that makes the system SZPF because it has the potential for having less checkpointing overhead. Designing an optimal ZPF quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithm remains an open problem. In a ZCF system, all the checkpoints are useful. However, due to the presence of noncausal Z-paths between checkpoints, constructing consistent global checkpoints incrementally is di cult. There are no e cient methods for constructing consistent global checkpoints in a ZCF system. So, nding a method to construct consistent global checkpoints e ciently in a ZCF system remains an open problem. Designing an optimal ZCF quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithm also remains an open problem. 
Conclusion
When processes take checkpoints independently, some or all of the checkpoints taken may be useless for the purpose of constructing consistent global checkpoints. Quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms force processes take communication induced checkpoints to minimize the useless checkpoints. Depending on the extent to which the useless checkpoints are minimized, we classi ed the quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms into various classes. This classi cation provides a clear understanding of the quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithms. We also discussed the merits of checkpointing algorithms belonging to one class over the checkpointing algorithms belonging to other classes. This classi cation also helps in designing more e cient algorithms and evaluating existing algorithms. It also helped identifying some open problems. We pointed out that designing an optimal ZPF quasi-synchronous checkpointing algorithm remains an open problem. Similarly, designing an optimal ZCF checkpointing algorithm as well as nding an e cient method to determine consistent global checkpoints in a ZCF system remain open problems.
